Eleva8or: The Virtual Accelerator Platform   for Emerging Markets

Eleva8or helps early stage startups prepare for the journey of investment. Offering a wide range of simplified, automated & easy-to-use tools such as:Pre-Revenue Valuation, Founders’ Equity Distribution,Term Sheet Wizard, Due-Diligence Checklists,Cap Table Builder, Pitchbook Samples and Auction Gateway.

According to the company’s website , the Basic Cap Table For First Time Founders is detailed below,

So your in an emerging market and have already struggled to launch your startup and now it’ time to think about your capitalization table.

In simple terms the “cap table” is a record of ownership. The cap table provides an analysis of the founders’ and investors’ percentage of ownership, equity dilution, and value of equity in each round of investment.

There are hundreds of examples on how to format a cap table.  In all cases excel is likely the best and easiest way to create and maintain a cap table:

  • Names (and sometimes contact details) of the shareholders are in the left most column
  • Capital contributions and units in the subsequent columns to the right
  • Co-founders and groups of investors, from earliest to most recent, are sequenced top to bottom separated by rows clarifying the class of stock and option holders.

Looks simple enough (we have  provided an example of a simple cap table below which can be viewed – it details 3 Co-Founders who contributed capital and are being transparent by sharing the liquid cash contributions, however often the co-founders do not need to share such details, the cap-table further shows an investment by 5 investors of varying amounts).

Keep in min the above is a first round cap table – managing the cap table can be chaotic, confusing and frustrating especially when bringing on more investors in future rounds. But if you’re a first time founder, all the more reason to get the structure right the first time from the get-go.  As your company continues to grow and evolve, the cap table will help you keep track of who owns what.

When first structuring your cap table, there are certain terms and formulas that are important to understand such as

  • Pre-Money Valuation: Value of your company determined prior to investment (in term sheet discussions)
  • Price-Per-Share: Pre-Money Valuation/Pre-Money Shares
  • Post-Money Valuation: Pre-Money Valuation + Total Investment Amount
  • Post-Money Shares: Post Money Valuation/ Price-Per-Share
  • Investor Percent Ownership:Investor Shares / Post-Money Shares

Always good to keep the cap table as simple and straightforward as possible to prevent any mishaps or confusion over stock ownership.


eleva8or’s online toolbox includes a fully-automated cab table builder (shown below), which you can easily use to gradually build yours as your startup grows.

Other benefits from the platform are support for startups and the support for investors;

  • Support for Startups:

Seeking investment for a new startup is no easy feat basically you would be asking people who don’t know you very well to entrust you with their hard-earned cash on a business that most likely doesn’t yet exist!

This is not impossible either, as you probably hear about people raising large amounts of funding all the time from the news and social media – so there must be an art to doing it. Eleva8or has recently published a complete, simplified guide to startup funding outlining all the main documents and activities required to get a startup ready for investment.

  • Support for Investors:

The company offer a steady deal flow of top-vetted startups from across all emerging markets who have been subject to out stringent screening and preparation process and deemed

“investment ready”.

I hope emerging and existing entrepreneurs in tech related businesses will benefit a lot from the Eleva8or platform.

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As Europe grapples with Brexit, the African Union seeks a more United States of Africa 

Since the United Kingdom voted for Brexit three years ago, the European Union has been struggling to work out a structure for its future relations with the country.

While debates about the unpredictability of economic and political relationships between the EU and Britain continue to linger, thousands of miles away, the AfricanUnion (AU) is creating a close-knit relationship among its own 55 member nations.

In 2013, the AU designed Agenda2063, a framework with set objectives to aid the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years.

The vision is to maintain integration of Africans on the continent, according to Khabele Matlosa, the organization’s Director of political affairs.

“The goal is to realise the union of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens,”

One of the ways the union is doing this is through the proposed launch of a continental passport known as the AU passport.

The passport will grant visa free access to every member state so Africans can move freely across the continent.

Presently, only Seychelles and Benin have no visa restrictions for Africa travelers. Read more via https://lnkd.in/d6dtQ5G


Mark-Anthony Johnson, CEO at JIC Holdings. Continue reading “As Europe grapples with Brexit, the African Union seeks a more United States of Africa “

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Africa is the least globally integrated continent in the world


Africa’s attempts to integrate must adapt to and manage factors such as changing technology, migration from the countryside to cities and Africa’s large informal sector estimated by the African Development Bank (AfDB) to contribute about 55% of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP. Nonetheless, most indicators point to a continent on the move. This  transition  will  be  facilitated  by  more  open  markets,  improving  infrastructure, access to technology and improved political stability. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) became the champion of regional integration, already in the mid-1960s proposing the division of Africa into regions for the purposes of economic development. In April 2001, African Heads of State launched the African Union at Sirte to replace the OAU.

Greater African unity has long been a cherished — but elusive — goal. There is now a renewed impetus to establish closer economic and political ties among the continent’s numerous countries, based on a heightened appreciation of the need for regional integration and a clearer understanding of the reasons for past failures. This series of articles examines some of the central challenges facing the drive for integration, including enhanced trade among African countries, more roads and other infrastructure, reform of regional institutions, greater accountability and popular involvement, and closer coordination of efforts by the public and private sectors.

The idea of better integrating African countries and regions has long been promoted by political leaders in speeches, official conferences and formal treaties, although with only limited results on the ground.The advantages are numerous. Wider regional markets can open up more opportunities for African producers and consumers, beyond the sometimes small markets within their own borders. It can reduce the costs of developing essential infrastructure, including transport, communications, energy, water systems and scientific and technological research, which often lie beyond the means of individual countries. At the same time, integration facilitates large-scale investment by “reinforcing the attractiveness of our economies and reducing the risks.”The momentum for integration has come not only from the top. At many levels of society, people are actively seeking to forge more ties with each other. For some, such links already exist. For many others, they still lie in the future. Africans have also learned from the failures of past initiatives. As a result, many proponents of integration now pursue a less grandiose and more practical approach.

There is only low level connectivity between African economies – although this is gradually improving (Visa Sub-Saharan Africa, 2013). This is largely due to an incomplete legal  architecture  for  regional  integration,  poor  physical  infrastructure  and  one-way trading relationships. Leading African exporters such as Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa have stronger economic links to the rest of the world than with regional neighbours. This represents lost economic opportunities. Integration and connectivity in other regions of the world have spurred growth in the free flow of goods, services, capital, and people. These regional economic activities and investment inter-linkages remain low in Africa.

Supply-side responses must be supported by a dynamic legal framework for regional integration, for both the continent and its constituent regional economic communities (RECs). Africa is not immune to the changing trends in the global economy. Production patterns  are  shifting  as  countries  become  less  specialised  and  trade  becomes  more regional  and  based  on  intermediate  products.  Moreover  Africa’s  middle  class,  now estimated at more than 300 million people and growing at a rate of 3.2% per year since 1983, could provide a formidable source of consumer demand.

With the United States, Europe and Japan all struggling for growth, opportunities are emerging for Africa to grow on home markets and through its own consumer demand. One example is trade in personal and household goods, which experienced the fastest growth among global merchandise of 10% in 2012. Coupled with sustained economic growth, demographic changes are expected to also transform trade. While parts of the world worry about ageing, Africa has the world’s youngest population. Two thirds of its total population is aged under 25. With appropriate skills, infrastructure and the right business environment, Africa could boast a skilled labour force to establish itself as a centre for global manufacturing and services.

Africa must unite not simply to enhance the continent’s weight in global affairs, they say, but also to meet the very real needs of its people. It will free up the time of African businesspeople to do business here. It will lower costs. It will make the African consumer’s plight so much more hopeful. We must build for ourselves. The reasons for sluggish integration within Africa’s regions and highlights a need for greater political efforts and better infrastructure. It  also  argues  that  the  continent’s  growing  middle  class  and  its  youthful  population could become a key source of demand for African produced goods and services as the expansion of African retail and financial services demonstrates.

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China’s shock therapy: An economic lesson for Africa


Prior to its economic reform and opening in 1979, China was a poor country with a per capita GDP less than one-third of the Sub- Saharan average. In the 38 years since, it averaged annual growth of 9.6 percent. And it is the only emerging market economy not to have suffered a systemic financial and economic crisis. Important in China’s success is that it did not follow the dominant mode of economic thinking, “shock therapy,” which simultaneously inflicts a wholesale set of politically difficult reforms. Instead, it adopted a pragmatic dual-track approach.

On one track, it continuously provided transitory protection and subsidies to large, capital-intensive state-owned enterprises that violated China’s comparative advantage but were essential for national defense and people’s basic needs. The state actively facilitated those industries to create comparative advantage by overcoming bottlenecks in hard and soft infrastructure. On the second track it liberalized the entry of private and foreign firms to China’s industries aligned with its comparative advantage. The shifts in comparative advantage allowed the government to deepen reforms, remove protections and subsidies, and allow the market to be decisive in allocating resources. China’s  economic  development  and  transition  provide  three  lessons  for  other  developing countries.

First, be pragmatic and realistic. It is essential to have objective and comprehensive assessments of the country’s basic realities and conditions — including its development stage and its labor, capital, and natural resource endowments  — and of the key problems and their origins.

Also essential is having a systematic assessment of countries at different development stages, and of the relations, differences, and complementarities with other countries.

Especially important is not blindly copying other countries, especially the theories, policies, and experiences of developed countries, in very different conditions. Second, formulate economic development and transition strategies suitable for one’s own country. Such strategies have many dimensions, including industrial policy.Technological innovation and industrial upgrading drive a developing country’s development.

But the upgraded industries need to be consistent with the country’s factor endowments to ensure that the factor costs of firms are the lowest in the world. That is not easy because the transaction costs for developing country firms are generally high due to inadequate infrastructure, institutions, and business environment. It is necessary to reduce firms’ transaction costs to increase their market competitiveness.

It is the government’s responsibility to improve infrastructure, the business environment and legal institutions. But its resources are limited and, therefore, they should be used strategically to improve infrastructure and other binding constraints in suitable locations so as to reduce transaction costs for the targeted industries to turn from comparative advantage to competitive advantages quickly.

In this way, small wins can be accumulated to become large wins. With vibrant economic development, the improvement of infrastructure, the business environment and legal institutions can be extended step-by-step nationwide.

Third, learn from the mistakes of structuralism’s excessive intervention and neoliberalism’s laissez-faire and instead have the market and the state play their respective roles in the economic transition.

Source: Adapted from Lin, J.Y., and Célestin Monga. 2017. Beating the Odds: Jump-Starting Developing Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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The reality of  the Nigerian Military Rule  2

Nigeria’s crude oil wealth paradoxically became an impediment to its democratic development,

as it incentivized the country’s military to seize and retain political

power. Within 18 months of seizing power, the Nigerian military threatened the cor-

porate existence of the country as two different factions of the army attempted to

secede, replicated Nigeria’s political and societal cleavages within itself, and plunged

the country into the brutal famine ravaged Biafran civil war that claimed over a mil-

lion lives, and presented Western viewers for the first time, with their now prototyp –

ical imagery of the emaciated and starving African child.


The excesses of the Nigerian  military were largely ignored by Western governments which

were anxious not to interrupt a generous supply of crude oil. Nigeria’s “Bonny Light” crude oil is

highly attractive to its Western importers as it has a low sulfur content and is easy to refine.

Therefore Western relations with Nigeria are largely dictated by economic interests rather than

by any sense of altruism or adherence to democratic principles.


It is often said that history is written by victors. In many cases in Nigeria, history

is not written at all. A combination of official reluctance to divulge combustible past

events in a country permanently poised on an ethnic and religious powder keg, and

the determination of the dramatis personae to avoid having their misdeeds exposed,

means that early Nigerian post-independence history is in many places a collection

of folk tales and fables. This has also caused Nigeria to be greatly misunderstood

and misrepresented overseas, especially in the area of the Nigerian military’s pivotal

interference in the politics and governance of Nigeria.


Nigerians are aware that their military ruled them for 30 out of the country’s first 40 years after

independence. Yet there is little situational awareness of how the military became so politically

powerful. Even though ostensibly democratic today, Nigeria is still dominated by the same

military cabal that over four decades sporadically overthrew democratically elected

governments, fought the Biafran civil war and imposed an economic blockade that

caused famine and a million deaths, recklessly squandered the country’s oil wealth,

and played the greatest role in disrupting the country’s political evolution.


The decade between 1966 and 1976 was the most politically explosive decade of

Nigeria’s history during which it almost disintegrated, and Nigerian governments

mastered the art of taking their country to the edge of an abyss and pulling back at

the last moment. Most of the prior books on this time period were written by the

protagonists, and their accounts are sometimes tainted by their embittered personal

experiences and grievances.


There is a substantial readership that desires a balanced,  impartial and full account of that crisis

racked decade. This book seeks to educate the reader about the dynamic that existed within the

military and which influenced its conduct and interference in Nigerian politics. Rather than

giving the sanitized version of coups that is in other books, the author has deliberately given

extremely graphic accounts of events in order for the reader to appreciate the ruthless brutality

that often accompanies military coups d’états.



Nigeria’s return to civilian democratic rule in 1999 has encouraged greater free-

dom of expression and political debate regarding topics that were considered taboo

in the days of military rule. This has presented a welcome opportunity to discuss pre-

viously taboo topics, in order that future generations can learn from them and avoid

the mistakes of the past. Those that do not heed history are doomed to repeat it.

Nigeria  recently  celebrated  50  years  as  an  independent  nation.


As it passed this milestone there is renewed interest in its history. Although modern

Nigeria cannot be understood without reference to its era of military rule, there is

little objective literature on the fifteen years of military rule (1984 –1999) that

preceded the current civilian  government.  The  small  body  of  literature  on  the  era

of military  rule  consists  largely  of  hagiographic  biographies  by,  or about, some

of the key personalities of the era.


The  second  period  of  military  rule  between  1984  and  1993 crafted modern

Nigerian society, and effected cataclysmic changes in Nigeria’s political, economic

and religious character that nearly tore the country apart on several occasions.

There is need for stock taking and objective analysis of the mistakes of the past.

The story  of Nigerian military rule is an untapped  vault for the non-academic

audience,  with  few  scholars  devoting  serious  effort  to  accurately recording it.

Little is known of Nigerian military political history due to an almost Mafia-like code

of silence by its leading figures. The result  has  been  public  discourse  dominated  by  JFK-esque conspiracy theories, rumour and innuendo. Official sources

have been  reluctant  to  divulge  details  of  Nigeria’s recent  past

largely because most of the key dramatis personnae are still alive,

and to avoid inflaming passions in an already volatile country.



Powerful personalities behind Nigeria’s military governments are

still active and influential in political positions, even if they have

removed their uniforms and transformed themselves into civilian

rulers. David Mark (former Senate President and the third most

powerful person in Nigeria’s political hierarchy) is a retired army

brigadier. His former military colleagues include active politicians

such as former governors Murtala Nyako, Olabode George (both retired

navy officers), and Jonah Jang (a retired air force officer).

The retired military even constitute the most significant opposition

figures. The present Nigeria President Muhammadu Buhari  is a

former military head of state with a rank of a Major-General .


Even some of the most powerful traditional rulers in Nigeria are

former military officers. The current Sultan of Sokoto,

Amir-ul  Mumineen 2   Muhammadu  Sa’adu  Abubakar,  was

formerly Colonel Abubakar of the Nigerian army’s armoured corps.

The current Emir of Zuru, Sani Sami is a retired major-general, and

the Etsu Nupe Alhaji Yahaya Abubakar is a former army colonel.

There are very few Emirs without sons or nephews in the military.

This continues a long tradition of blue bloods in the military first

pioneered by Major-General Hassan Katsina, the late Chief of Army

Staff and son of the former Emir of Katsina, Usman Nagogo. Major-

General  Shehu  Musa  Yar’Adua,  older  brother  of  Nigeria’s  former

President Umaru Yar’Adua, was also of aristocratic origin. His father

Mallam Musa Yar’Adua was the Mutawallen Katsina (custodian of

treasury of the Katsina Emirate Council).


After gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1960,

Nigeria’s parliamentary Westminster-style democracy collapsed on

January 15, 1966, when a group of radical young army majors staged

a military coup and overthrew the civilian government of Prime

Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Although the coup leaders did

not manage to seize power for themselves, the coup’s violent nature,

and  assassination  of  key  government  personnel  such  as  Prime

Minister Balewa, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello (Premier of the Northern

Region),  Samuel  Akintola  (Premier  of  the  Western  Region),  and

Festus Okotie-Eboh (Finance Minister) was enough to topple the

government and persuade the rump cabinet to cede power to the

General  Officer  Commanding  (GOC)  the  army,  Major-General

Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi.


Although Ironsi had suppressed the coup and was not among its

planners, he was unable to escape the stigma attached to it. Northern

soldiers were aggrieved at the coup’s lopsided nature and became

suspicious of it, and of Ironsi’s motives. Since most of the coup’s

planners were Igbo, their victims were non-Igbo, and its outcome

was a military government led by an Igbo army officer, northerners

suspected  that  the  coup  was  an  orchestrated  conspiracy  to  wrest

power  away  from  the  northern-led  civilian  government.  These

tensions and suspicions led to another coup by northern officers 3

in July 1966, during which Ironsi was assassinated and replaced by

Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon. Gowon governed until July 1975 when

he was deposed by the same soldiers who had staged the coup that

brought him to power in 1966.


The new military leader was Brigadier Murtala Muhammed, the

leader of the July 1966 coup. After Muhammed was assassinated

during  an  abortive  attempted  coup  in  February  1976,  he  was

replaced by his deputy, Lt-General Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo

remained  in  power  for  almost  four  years,  leading  the  country

back to civilian democracy before stepping down in October 1979

after  multi-party  elections  were  won  by  Alhaji  Shehu  Shagari  of

the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The voluntary surrender of

power was a source of great pride and prestige to the military, but

it amplified its political ambitions by giving it a self-righteous air of

being the nation’s political custodian and moral conscience.


The transfers of power from one military regime to another were

not random. Each coup and government had substantial continuity

of personnel. The same people have controlled Nigerian political and

military life since 1966. The group of officers that brought Gowon

to power in August 1966 formed the foundation of all succeeding

military  regimes  until  1998.  Although  leadership  of  the  regimes

changed, the personalities behind the coups and regimes did not.


The 1966 cadre created successive dynastic military regimes for the

next 32 years. The young non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and

lieutenants who blasted Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi from power

in  1966  became  the  colonels  who  ousted  his  successor  General

Gowon  in  1975,  and  they  became  the  Brigadiers  and  Major-

generals who overthrew President Shagari in 1983. These officers

included Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, Muhammadu Buhari,

Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, Aliyu Mohammed, Joshua Dogonyaro, Jerry

Useni and Ibrahim Bako.


Between  1966  and  1979,  Nigerian  military  regimes  ruled  with

a  deft  touch,  and  rarely  resorted  to  ruthless  force.  Apart  from

being unelected, they behaved little differently from the civilians

they replaced. Most regimes during this era would probably have

defeated  their  predecessor  civilian  government  in  an  election

and  were  generally  more  popular  than  civilian  governments.

The military was perceived to be an agent of order and stability,

in  contrast  to  the  institutional  chaos  that  accompanied  civilian

politicians.  The  military  governed  with  popular  appeal  and  little

opposition.  Each  military  government  was  welcomed

with  jubilation  and  great  optimism.  The  incoming  government

would then reciprocate that optimism with grandiose promises of

reform and an end to the ills of its predecessor.







The army’s journey into politics was akin to sitting an exam prior

to  attending  lectures.  The  1980s  Nigerian  army  was  a  legacy  of

the civil war during which mass military recruitment swelled the

military’s manpower from 10,000 in 1966 to approximately 250,000

by the end of the war in 1970. A swollen military became a drain on

government finances, and an internal security risk. Nigeria faced

no external military threat from a foreign power, thus the army’s

role was largely devoted to the suppression of communal riots and

international peacekeeping missions. With no external enemies to

fight, military heroism tended to be sought in the political arena

rather  than  on  the  battlefield.


The  nature  of  military  governance changed greatly during the 1980s.

Coups became motivated by a desire for personal gain, rather than

by altruism or ideology. Public optimism about military rule dissipated

when the public realised that  only  the  leaders  had  changed,

but  the  underlying  problems which were cited as justifications for

military governance continued despite the change of personnel.


The military  doctor  became infected by  the  ills  it  came  to  cure.

Soldiers  were  corrupted  by  politics  as  quickly  and  absolutely  as

civilians had been. Although the military claimed to bring law and

order, communal, criminal and religious violence increased under its

watch. It continually promised to eradicate corruption, yet military

officers were indicted for corruption. As it extended its rule to attempt

resolution of these new issues, the military found itself engaged in

an  endless  merry  go  round  of  fire-fighting.  By  the  time  it  tackled

one  issue,  several  more  had  arisen.


As  the  military  became  more  politicised, ethnic and religious cleavages

in civil society replicated in the officer corps. Ultimately, the military

became overburdened by its workload of governance, political reform,

and transitioning back to  democracy,  while  simultaneously  trying

to  keep  its  own  house in order and protect itself against coups from within.

Military rule became more toxic than incompetent civilian rule, because

soldiers can  get  away  with  much  more  in  government  since  they

control the state’s instruments of violence, and do not have to worry about

becoming unpopular enough to lose elections.

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The reality of the Nigerian Military Rule  1


Nigeria  is  a  country  of  great  diversity  and  contradiction.  A

country with over 180 million people spread across 250 different

ethnic groups, half of them Christian, half of them Muslim. It has

world class wealth, yet is full of poor people. Christians live in the

supposedly Muslim north; Muslims live in the supposedly Christian

south,  and  some  ethnic  groups  (like  the  Yoruba)  practice  both

Christianity and Islam. Yet through all the contradiction, diversity

and linguistic confusion, there has been one constant in Nigerian

life: military interference in politics.


Sometimes referred to as the “Giant of Africa,” with a population

of over 180 million, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country; a quarter

of all Africans are Nigerian. Nigeria is located in west Africa, just north

of the equator and south of the Sahara desert. Its southern coastline

dips into the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria is the United  States’ largest trading

partner in sub-Saharan Africa, with annual trade between the two countries

in 2009 valued at approximately $30 billion.


Nigeria exports more than one million barrels of crude oil a day to the United

States (representing nearly 50% of Nigeria’s daily crude oil production), and it is

projected that by 2015, Nigeria will provide 25% of the United States’ oil supply. 1

With the United States’ frequently strained relations with Arab countries, Nigeria is

increasingly viewed in Washington as an alternate dependable crude oil supplier.


Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) is larger than the combined GDP of its

fifteen neighboring west African countries that make up the Economic Community

of West African States (ECOWAS). It is a regional economic, political and military

superpower in west Africa, is blessed with abundant wealth from crude oil and natu-

ral gas, has the best educated workforce in Africa, and enjoys a vibrant free press with

over one hundred privately owned newspapers and magazines.


Its nationals  are  leaders in  arts, science,  finance  and literature. Professor  Wole

Soyinka is Africa’s most distinguished playwright and was the first African to win the

Nobel Prize for literature. Nigeria’s former Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is a

Managing Director of the World Bank. Dr. Augustine Njoku-Obi developed a chol-

era vaccine. Despite having all the prerequisites to become a superpower, Nigeria

staggers from one crisis to another. After ten military coups, three heads of govern-

ment assassinated, three ruinous decades of military dictatorship, and a civil war that

claimed a million lives, Nigeria is still struggling to fulfill its vast potential.


Under military rule, the country abandoned its traditionally agriculture-based

economy  and  adopted  a  dangerously  polarized  oil-dominant  economy  that  is  ex-

tremely susceptible to fluctuations in oil prices. Nigeria became almost totally de –

pendent on earnings from its crude oil exports which currently account for over 90%

of its foreign exchange earnings. Since Nigeria’s oil is exclusively located in the south

of the country, this also polarized the country on ethnic and religious lines, with the

mainly Christian inhabitants of the oil producing southern areas bitterly resenting

that the revenue from oil drilled from their land is used to develop non-oil producing



Oil is obtained from only 9 of Nigeria’s 36 states. 1  Approximately 75% of Nigeria’s

oil and over 50% of its earnings are obtained from just three of these oil producing

states. 2   Despite producing the overwhelming majority of Nigeria’s wealth, the inhab-

itants of the oil communities do not have the political strength to resist control of

their resources by Nigeria’s federal government.


Read more:

1. Soldiers of Fortune by Max Siollun.

2. Oil, Politics and Violence : Nigeria’s  Military Coup Culture

(1966–1976) by Max Siollun.

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